In his book, I am You, Daniel Kolak offers yet another radical theory of personal identity: There is only one person, and that person is all of us. Daniel Kolak (born in Zagreb, Croatia) is a Croatian-American philosopher who works In his groundbreaking I Am You: the Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics, he writes: “The central thesis of I Am You – that we are all the same . Pris: kr. Inbunden, Skickas inom vardagar. Köp I Am You av Daniel Kolak på
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Kluwer Academic Publishers; Springer Netherlands. You may still fear dying, of course, but dying is not as bad as living and suffering uselessly for years in an institution. If we all truly believed that in inflicting harm on one another we are only hurting ourselves, then surely we would stop, and the world would be a vaniel better place as a result. Is this a matter of leaping in faith to what we know must be true? Thus, Quine can clearly describe rabbit-stages, which are temporal slices of a rabbit, each of which is spatially ak with the rabbit at some time, but none of which is identical to the rabbit.
Another hint of the allure appears in the Preliminary Acknowledgements, where Kolak yiu the physicist Freeman Dyson, who, in his school days, had the same idea:.
Of course that is what Kolak believes—but the argument from dreams fails to show it. You know what I call this spot? Our borders do not signify boundaries between persons. Skickas inom vardagar. So why that path? This entry has no external links. Presumably, at that moment he could look forward simultaneously to more than one personal future: Mail will not be published required. In particular, his focus on the psychological conditions under which we extend self-concern to some persons in the future and past and not others, holds promise to shed light on the subject.
Persons and Psychological Frameworks: History of Western Philosophy.
Carter – – Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 1: In his groundbreaking I Am You: Kolak yuo to say that his muggers, who do not exist outside his dream, are counter-examples to the principle that persons with different mental lives are different persons.
Kolak’s Lovers of Wisdom website was designed by former William Paterson University philosophy students. From a Metaphysical and Metapsychological Point of View. I believe I am person p just in case I have self-concern for person p. But, he argues, the muggers in his dream are not other people; being dreamed by Kolak, mere products of his mind, they are as much Kolak as is the first-person protagonist of the dream, the muggee.
Human beings started mythologizing their pasts and dreaming about their personal futures to an extent not seen in any other species.
Omniorthogonal: I Am You
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. He says that, if and when human fission becomes a reality, we will no longer be able to count persons reliably by counting heads. It does not depend on a misunderstanding of what it is to be the same person over time.
I can believe that I do now have another stream of consciousness, of which, in this stream, I am now unaware.
There is only one person, and that person is all of us. At twenty-something he went off to London. It is our great strength, but can also make us miserable and lonely, feeling isolated from others. When I talk to my Replica on Mars, this is merely like the communication in the Physics Exam between myself in my two streams.
The difference between the cases is merely a matter of degree.
If I wonder whether I will survive, what I mostly care about is quite simple. Not only do they not have subjective experience, they do not have physical bodies. Why have I spent forty years I know, right? This way my kids can ride their bikes and go out directly in that cul-de-sac, but this was only part of my motivation.
Friends from London would visit his retreat, and he would once again play the role of poet for them. Certainly we cannot know the particulars of life on those islands—the full inner experience of our mother or our best friend or our sweetheart or our child.
Here not the false ego of psychological identification but the true intuition of the subject-in-itself—the intuition of personal identity, rears its nonexistent head, the self-consciousness behind the mask of identification. The Psychological Criterion Chapter 6, of I am YouPsychological Borders, examines the view that personal survival consists in psychological continuity and connectedness.
In presenting his klak, the author relies on detailed analyses of recent formal work on personal identity, especially that of Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert Nozick, David Wiggins, Daniel C. He reconciled this with the logic of identity by asserting that there were two persons all along. If person A splits into person B and person C, both of whom are well connected with the original person A, then—as soon as B and C are clearly established as independent entities, each leading his or her own life—we should conclude that B is not wm same person as C, and hence, since both Yiu and C have essentially the same relationship to A, neither of them are amm same person as A.
In this book I explain how this is possible.
Daniel Kolak – Wikipedia
Crosby – – Journal dankel Medicine and Philosophy 18 4: Kolak takes the common-sense view of MPD, that the disorder is one of different personalities of a single person. The net effect is a demonstration of the plasticity of the concept of a person. The Parfit on Mars, who has good prospects, has become the Main Line. This page was last edited on 21 Decemberat Kolak is a prolific philosopher, with over thirty-five authored books and nearly two hundred books edited.
The question is how far. Since Parfit can take this view of the Branch-Line Case, in which the life of one branch is expected to be short, why, Kolak wonders, does he not take a similar view of fission cases where each branch goes on to live for years?